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Central African Republic (CAR), and South
Sudan.208 Though not a priority in the past,
the United States has begun to take a
vested interest in the stability and security of
the African continent, particularly since the
attack on the American diplomatic mission
at Benghazi, Libya on September 11,
2012.209
Due to political and diplomatic
concerns, U.S. intervention in Africa has
mostly been limited to participation in UN
peacekeeping
missions.210
Special
Operations Forces are
heavily utilized
when direct action is undertaken, usually in
the form of JSOC (Joint Special Operations
Command)
raids
on
time-sensitive
objectives considered to be in the American
national interest; most recently, the rescue
of Jessica Buchanan and Poul Hagen
Thisted from Somalia during Operation
Octave Fusion in January 2012.211 In more
sustained conflicts, such as those occurring
in the central African nations, the U.S.
would not be able to intervene significantly
without committing to full-scale operations
with conventional forces. For this reason,
SOCOM is likely to become a leading
influence in future U.S. operations in Africa,
as it has been in Afghanistan since 2001.212
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United States Special Operations Forces
are beginning to take the lead in U.S.
military operations in Africa, highlighting a
new combat model for future U.S.
campaigns.
The United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) has taken a lead
role in anti-terror operations since 9/11.
Small teams of experienced and welltrained operators have been found to be
more adaptable in counter-insurgency
efforts than conventional, line unit forces.205
Over the course of the U.S. War on Terror,
USSOCOM's leadership has established
and continually refined an unofficial model
of operations that is becoming widely
adopted by the U.S. military during its
involvement
in
Operations
Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn.
As these operations draw to a close,
SOCOM’s operations model is likely to be
applied to other theaters of conflict,
including the continent of Africa.206
The continent of Africa has been
increasingly utilized as a stronghold by
Islamist terror groups in recent years,
including al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabbab in
Somalia.207 Africa also accommodates
groups accused of human rights violations.
One such group is the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), which operates in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the
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defense.218 The U.S. also supplied logistics
and intelligence support to regional forces
opposing the LRA. This limited role prevents
additional combat deployments in the wake
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while
still enabling the U.S. to influence the
outcome of the conflict.
U.S. Special Operations roles are
not limited to advising and training regional
forces. SOCOM commands many language
and culture specialists assigned to
specialized Civil Affairs (CA) units, or
attached to Special Forces Operational
Detachment Alphas (ODAs).219 Culture and
human intelligence (HUMINT) expertise is
especially important when SOF operate in a
predominantly tribal society, as in
Afghanistan.220 Special Forces receive more
advanced cultural awareness training than
conventional forces, and are typically more
adaptable
to
varied
operating
environments.221 These skills make SOF
personnel valuable HUMINT assets when
coupled with their knowledge of the
strategic situation. This expertise applies
well to the cultural situation in many areas
of Africa, and will likely contribute
significantly to SOCOM involvement in the
region.
Additional current conflicts in Africa
may become a hotbed for activity by U.S.
and other nations' Special Operations
Forces in the near future. The rebellion in
the Republic of Mali may be a fitting
example. Following the fall of Libyan
dictator Moammar Gadhafi, an influx of
arms and fighters from the Libyan Army into

In previous conventional wars,
special warfare units acted primarily in
support of conventional troops. However,
during operations in Afghanistan, special
operations' unique capabilities became vital
to U.S. military success in the conflict.
Utilizing language and foreign training
expertise, U.S. Army Special Forces trained
and fought alongside Afghan National Army
(ANA) soldiers. This strengthened the ability
of the Afghan military to engage the Taliban
without
assistance
from
NATO's
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).213 By providing the training and
support necessary for the ANA to become
independent, the U.S. has turned them into
a force multiplier, allowing ISAF personnel
to focus on specific objectives rather than
providing regional security. Training and
equipping the ANA also enables ISAF to
leave Afghanistan with a more capable
defense against the Taliban. This strategy
of utilizing indigenous forces is already used
against the LRA in Central Africa.214
On October 14, 2011, U.S. President
Barack Obama ordered the deployment of
approximately 100 U.S. Special Operations
personnel to the LRA's area of operations in
and near Uganda.215 According to unofficial
reports, the personnel were part of the U.S.
Army's 10th Special Forces Group out of
Fort Carson, Colorado.216 The primary
objective of the deployment was to support
Ugandan and other regional forces working
to kill or capture Joseph Kony, leader of the
LRA.217 On the President's orders, the SOF
personnel were to act as "military advisors"
and were only to engage the LRA in self-
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northern
Mali
strengthened
Tuareg
insurgent groups in the area.222 Soldiers and
Tuareg militias in northern Mali rebelled
against the Malian government in the south,
effectively splitting the country in two.223 The
rebellion forced Malian forces out of the
north, allowing Islamist groups to establish a
presence there.224
In January 2013, after the Malian
government requested assistance in
retaking northern Mali, French forces
launched
Operation
Serval.225
This
intervention was an effort to aid Malian
forces in taking back northern Mali, in order
to prevent Islamist groups, such as AQIM,
from establishing permanant bases of
operation there.226 In international military
interventions such as this, Special
Operations are likely to be utilized in order
to keep overall foreign military involvement
to the smallest footprint possible. It appears
that France has employed this tactic during
its involvement in Mali. Reports from a
Malian source to the Agence France-Presse
(AFP) indicate that French Special Forces
are training and fighting with the Malian
army.227 There are unofficial reports of
British228 and U.S. Special Forces training
troops in Mali as well.229 U.S. involvement

has thus far been limited to logistical
support by air, and further involvement
would likely not be advertised by the U.S.
government.230 Future U.S. intervention in
Africa will probably follow a similiar model to
the French involvement in Mali. U.S. Special
Operations will likely have a larger role, as
the U.S. Special Operations program is
being emphasized more intently following
the downsizing of overall U.S. military
strength.231
As the United States draws down its
conventional role in Afghanistan, as it has in
Iraq, Special Operations will begin to take a
lead role in U.S. military actions, as the
DOD calls for smaller, more flexible
forces.232 In recent years, the continent of
Africa, home to many weak or failing
nations, has attracted militant Islamist
groups to establish a foothold on the
continent. As the U.S. shifts its attention in
overseas anti-terror operations away from
Afghanistan, it appears that Africa may
become the next significant theatre in which
USSOCOM will need to prepare to operate.
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